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Abstract 
 
Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Manchuria Motion Picture 
Corporation (Man’ei) was established in Manchukuo. Aiming to be the “Hollywood of the 
Orient,” Man’ei operated as the only legitimate film corporation in Manchukuo, and its activities 
included all aspects of local film production, distribution, and exhibition. Studies of Man’ei have 
tended to describe its activities as part of the colonial project unilaterally implemented by 
Japanese officials and ideologues. However, the negotiations and contestations involved in the 
Man’ei project render any simple interpretations impossible, especially within the broader 
historical and political context of the Japanese empire. This article explores how the theme of 
“ethnic harmony” (minzoku kyōwa) became the core issue for Man’ei and how its attempted 
filmic expressions ended up uncovering the complexity and predicament involved in the problem 
of spectatorship. Li Xianglan (Ri Kōran), Manei’s best-received transcolonial movie star at the 
time, represented the multiple ethnicities of Manchukuo; however, it is less well known that her 
“mainland romance films” were considered inappropriate for audiences in Manchukuo (Mankei). 
This article will complicate earlier assumptions and show that the theme of “ethnic harmony” 
came to be marginalized, while entertainment films presumably acceptable to the Mankei 
audience came to centrally preoccupy the feature films of Man’ei. 
 
Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Manchuria Motion Picture 
Corporation (hereafter, Man’ei ??????) was established in Manchukuo, the so-called 
Japanese puppet state in Northeast China (1932–1945). Aiming to be the “Hollywood of the 
Orient,” Man’ei not only monopolized the production, distribution, and screening of films in 
Manchukuo but also centralized the entire range of Manchukuo’s film-related activities, such as 
managing cinema schools, screening films in rural areas, and sponsoring studies of film 
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technology. Man’ei was considered the only legitimate film company operating within 
Manchukuo, and during its eight years of existence it produced approximately 100 feature films, 
180 documentary films, and hundreds of newsreel items. Why was this large-scale, state-led film 
corporation established in the midst of a full-scale war? What did it mean to set up a new film 
studio, particularly in Manchukuo, where it was believed that no indigenous film industry existed 
and that cinematic illiteracy among local peoples prevailed? 
Existing studies have tended to view Man’ei as a peculiar and exceptional part of 
Japanese film history or to focus on major figures such as Li Xianglan (Ri Kōran) and Amakasu 
Masahiko (Satō 1995; High 2003; Yamaguchi 1989). Other studies, especially those from the 
perspective of Chinese film history, have reduced the role of Man’ei to “cultural enslavement” of 
local peoples by Japanese imperialists (Cheng, Li, and Xing 1963; Hu and Gu 1999). In the last 
decade, academic interest in Man’ei has grown significantly (Yomota 2001; Stephenson 1999; 
Ikegawa 2011; Lahusen 2000; Baskett 2005; Yomota and Yan 2010), for two main reasons: the 
increase in availability of Man’ei film materials since the mid-1990s (Yamaguchi 1994) and the 
emergence of new historical perspectives that underscore transcoloniality beyond postwar 
national boundaries in East Asia, a factor that also contributed to the proliferation of studies on 
Manchukuo within the framework of so-called empire history (teikokushi). 
Despite the increasing scholarly attention paid to this peculiar cultural institution, 
however, the complicated relationship between its extensive cultural and ideological layout and 
the changing Japanese colonial strategies have remained largely unexplored. In order to 
understand this relationship, it is important to take into account the political form that 
Manchukuo adopted as Japanese imperialism proceeded: Manchukuo asserted itself not as a 
colony of Japan but as a new nation-state “allied” with the Japanese empire. To what extent did 
this new form of alliance (in contrast to the metropole-colony model) come from the need to 
camouflage the undeniable military campaigns waged in the early conquest of Northeast China 
since the late 1920s? What were the real effects and consequences of this new gesture, which 
may have been regarded as different from, and even contradictory to, the existing imperialist 
strategies in other colonies and acquired territories? Regardless of how nominal and disguised 
the articulation of Manchukuo as an “independent allied state” was in actuality, what is at stake 
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here is grasping the empire’s changing strategies to better dominate local peoples and territories 
in the transforming international milieu. 
In this article, I take the case of Manchukuo as a prototype of a new, twentieth-century 
form of imperialism (Duara 2003) as a critical starting point in exploring the politics of media 
culture in Manchuria. The role of propaganda and ideological war, in this sense, became a crucial 
site of contestation, especially when nation building and identity formation were under way. 
Man’ei and its discursive cinematic activities vigorously took part in this process. 
I attempt, in particular, to spotlight how the practice of propaganda was adapted and 
compromised in relation to Man’ei’s key ideology of “ethnic harmony,” while situating my 
analysis in the broader historical context of Manchukuo and the Japanese empire. By unraveling 
how this official ideology came close to bankruptcy and how the resulting reformulation 
occurred at the level of representation, I intend to provide a window into the predicament and 
arbitrariness of national subject formations. 
 
Films for Total War 
In order to better understand Man’ei as a specific form of propaganda machine, it should 
be noted that the tendency toward nation-directed film control at this time was by no means 
limited to Manchukuo. In fact, the years of Man’ei’s presence coincided with the high tide of 
state intervention in film and media in major film-producing countries. On the one hand, this 
state intervention existed partially to protect national cinema against Hollywood’s increasing 
domination of domestic film markets. On the other hand, and more importantly, this state 
intervention occurred because film came to be regarded as a highly effective political tool, 
especially with its ability to make strong appeals to the public for wartime mobilization. 
 To give a few examples: the Soviet Union sought to nationalize its film industry from its 
inception; the Nazi government chose to gradually purchase and hold the majority shareholding 
in Germany’s major film companies; France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, in less direct ways, 
implemented a variety of film policies, ranging from film import control and censorship to 
national film support. What is clear is that the 1930s saw the rise of political interest in films as 
one of the most powerful mass media, and this seems to have opened up a new channel for what 
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George L. Mosse (1975) calls the “aesthetics of politics,” where drama and liturgy would be 
used to establish symbols, myths, and shared feelings among the masses.1 
In this sense, the establishment of Man’ei exemplified a globally growing trend toward 
strong association between the film industry and state policy since World War I. Initially funded 
by the Manchukuo government and the South Manchuria Railway Company, Man’ei was 
organized and operated in accordance with the 1937 Manchukuo Film Law, which preceded its 
counterparts elsewhere, such as the Japan Motion Picture Law (1939) and the Korean Motion 
Picture Ordinance (1940). 
In contrast to Japan and colonial Korea, where the authorities tried to control the existing 
film industry through regulations and mergers, the newly born Manchukuo rapidly began to 
establish its film industry from scratch. Man’ei’s activities included not only film production, 
distribution, and exhibition but also the training of film experts and actors and the promotion of 
research on film technology. This can be regarded as the prototype for wartime film control by 
the state or as an attempt to create the cinematic “new order” then being pursued by the Japanese 
central government and filmmakers. Although discussions of the reorganization of the film 
industry began in earnest in Japan in the mid-1930s, at a time when the industry was producing 
an average of five hundred films per year, the actual rationalization process took place in 
Manchukuo. Indeed, Man’ei was born at a time when no indigenous film industry existed to 
coordinate the various interests involved; it also benefited from its status as a latecomer in that it 
was able to immediately utilize advanced technologies. Man’ei, therefore, was a kind of radically 
rationalized and highly bureaucratized form of state-led film industry based on wartime 
economic controls. 
 
Toward “National Romanticism” 
The extraordinary efforts Manchukuo put into this ideological apparatus should, in fact, 
be explained in terms of its constant emphasis on political legitimacy since the state’s foundation 
in 1932. Manchukuo was in many ways a propaganda state that sought legitimate recognition of 
its existence—both domestically and internationally—precisely because it had been the product 
of the unilateral military actions of the Kwantung Army. Furthermore, in the midst of the Sino-
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Japanese War that erupted a mere five years after its foundation, Manchukuo was forced to 
further hasten its efforts to prepare itself for total war. In this context, the significance of 
propaganda came to be widely appreciated, as the home front and domestic mobilization were 
regarded as crucial to the war effort. 
One interesting aspect of the official discourse on the issue of propaganda and education 
in Manchukuo, just as in other existing nation-states, then, is the considerable emphasis placed 
upon people’s participation as active subjects in modern mass politics. The government officials 
and journalists in Manchukuo proposed that, in modern societies, coercive measures alone were 
no longer sufficient to implement national policies effectively; instead, they felt it was now 
crucial to persuade the people themselves to take responsibility for the implementation of these 
policies. Horiuchi Kazuo, chief of the Public Information Section (hongbaochu ???) in 
Manchukuo, tried to link the notion of “social education” to that of propaganda, claiming that it 
was desirable to make the latter closer to, and ultimately convergent with, the former.2 In other 
words, the most effective all-out mobilization was expected to be achieved only when the people 
understood, consented to, and thus voluntarily supported national policies. 
Furthermore, the specific, fundamental task faced by the Manchukuo officials was how 
to transform their people, with their complex ethnic composition—Chinese, Japanese, Korean, 
Manchu, Russian, and Mongol—into a nation (kokumin). Education director Tamura Toshio of 
Manchukuo’s Department of Public Welfare (minshengbu ??? ) made clear that the 
cornerstone of Manchukuo propaganda should be “national romanticism” (kokuminteki 
romanchishizumu) or “national mythology” (kokuminteki shinwa) (Tamura 1938). He pointed 
out that Manchukuo lacked the conditions, such as history, tradition, and legend, through which 
its people could presumably be united as one nation. Clearly, he was immensely conscious of the 
multiethnic composition of Manchukuo’s kokumin, which potentially contained tensions due to 
its different cultures and sentiments. Thus, propaganda for him meant more than just the usual 
concrete slogans for the purpose of urgent mobilization; it was a vehicle that was expected to 
nurture and shape shared feelings and emotions beyond logic in the long run. 
Indeed, it is possible to see that, for Tamura, the project of nation building was a more 
arduous task than building up a state’s bureaucratic and physical infrastructures. Despite the 
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catchphrases commonly used at the time, which reveal the developmentalist nature of the 
Manchukuo state—catchphrases such as kensetsu (construction) or kenkoku (literally, “state 
building”)—it was probably difficult for Tamura to utilize these phrases for the project of 
national subject formation as well as for developing the concept of “Manchukuoans,” since he 
was acutely aware that the identity formation process would require more than corporeal and 
material mobilization. 
Therefore, the investment in the film industry as a national policy can ironically be 
attributed to the inferior domestic conditions for effective propaganda. It seems that, for 
government officials like Tamura, the most cutting-edge technology was essential to galvanize 
the “semifeudal” and “illiterate” people of Manchukuo. Insofar as the propaganda personnel 
were concerned about how to mold people’s minds, the intensive audiovisual effects of film were 
expected to perform an instrumental role in spreading the spirit of Manchukuo. 
 
“Ethnic Harmony” as Pan-Asian Universalism 
What, then, constitutes the authentic Manchurian culture? What memories of the past 
and inherent cultural values were available as the raw materials for Man’ei films? One important 
thing to keep in mind when considering the issue of Manchurian culture (Manshū bunka ???
?) is that we should carefully avoid the danger of simply contrasting this “fake” case of 
Manchukuo with other cases of “genuine” nation-states—those that remain as independent 
nation-states today, such as Japan, Korea, and China. That is to say, we should not overlook the 
fact that every specific national culture that is attributed to its nation-state is itself an arbitrary 
and ideological product. Any so-called national culture is necessarily eclectic and selective in 
essence, and therefore we cannot postulate an inevitable correspondence between a particular 
culture and a nation-state. What happens, rather, is a series of processes and practices in which 
certain cultural elements are chosen, sorted, interpreted, and then forged into a national culture, 
while others are discarded or oppressed.3 The only unique factor in the case of Manchukuo is 
that, due to its violent and abrupt process of state building, the very arbitrariness and artificiality 
of constituting a “national culture” appears all the more conspicuous to both the local people of 
Manchukuo and the international community. 
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The problem faced by the Manchukuo government and Man’ei was that they lacked 
cultural sources that could appropriately be used to “invent traditions.” As in the case of other 
nation-states, government officials and scholars in Manchukuo initially paid attention to the 
legacies and memories of the past. Yet they were at a loss as to how to manipulate the past and 
historical events in politically innocuous and productive ways. Due to the multiethnic 
composition of the Manchuokuoan peoples, it was clearly difficult to construct a “Manchurian 
culture”—in the sense of a national culture of Manchukuo and Manchukuoans—based on the 
history of any particular ethnic group or dynasty. 
This dilemma is clear in the special precautions taken by the Kwantung Army and 
Manchukuo government officials to curb the interpretation that Manchukuo was somehow a 
reestablishment of the Qing Dynasty (?朝復辟). They saw that propping up Puyi as the 
symbolic head of the new Manchukuo state could potentially engender such a dangerous 
“misconception.” In the meantime, it was also impractical for them to pick cultures that could 
allude to a direct association to mainland China, because Manchukuo was, since its inception, a 
new state born with the declaration of “independence” from the Chinese nationalist regime. In 
addition, adopting Japanese culture was not an option, since they were eager to erase the 
shameful label of military occupation and, ultimately, the view of Manchukuo as a “puppet state” 
of imperialist Japan. 
A compelling alternative put forth by some colonial officials was a form of cultural 
heterogeneity based upon ethnic diversity and the discontinuous nature of Manchuria’s culture. 
Matsuura Kasaburō, a historian of Oriental studies at Xinjing’s (Shinkyō) National Foundation 
University (Kenkoku Daigaku ????), introduced two key influences on Manchurian culture 
after briefly summarizing the historical fluctuations of Han Chinese and Tungus in Manchuria. 
First, he claimed that there was a lack of cultural continuity caused by frequent changes in 
sovereign powers. Second, there was a lack of any “essence” in Manchuria due to the 
intermittent implants of “Chinese culture” that had historically transferred over the Shanhai Pass. 
Consequently, he argued that the culture that would flourish in Manchukuo should be neither 
“Sino” nor “Japanese” flavored, but something completely different—something created by the 
various ethnic groups residing in Manchuria (Matsuura 1941). That is to say, the very condition 
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of ethnic diversity and subsequent prospects for ethnic harmony were deemed central to 
Manchurian culture. 
 Not surprisingly, Man’ei’s staff attempted to define the characteristic of its films in a 
similar vein—that is, in terms of the theme of ethnic harmony. Comments such as “Ethnic 
harmony film should constitute truly Manchurian films” frequently appeared in Man’ei’s official 
popular magazine, and the theme was officially promoted as a designated motif for public story 
contests. The film academy of Man’ei planned to recruit more actors from ethnic minorities so 
that it could make “authentic” Manchurian films. Above all, apart from its connection to the 
official ideology, the issue of ethnic harmony was in fact a practical concern for the Man’ei staff. 
The issue came repeatedly to the foreground in the actual process of film production, in which 
actors, most of whom were Mankei (literally “Manchurian,” but also including Han Chinese and 
Mongolians), and directors, most of whom were Nikkei (literally “Japanese,” but also including 
other Japanese imperial subjects such as Koreans), had to cooperate beyond cultural and 
linguistic differences. In a sense, all Man’ei films were coproductions between at least the 
Mankei and Nikkei staff.4 Besides, the call for ethnic harmony films was more often than not 
based on the observation that the target audience in Manchuria would consist of various ethnic 
groups. In other words, the perceived diversity of audiences themselves was regarded as a 
significant determinant of the themes or content of films, rather than the other way around. 
This is evident in Japanese critic Satō Tomonobu’s observations of watching the 
Japanese-language version of a newly released Man’ei film, Iron Blood, Wise Mind (Tiexue 
huixin, ????, 1939), in a Japanese theater in Xinjing. He remembered noticing that the 
Nikkei audience laughed and clapped at the same scenes as the Mankei audience had during 
another screening in a Chinese theater. From this he concluded that even though different ethnic 
groups reacted similarly to tropes such as humor and satire, Man’ei must pay close attention to 
how these feelings could be expressed differently according to different ethnic traditions and 
habits. He thus put forth a direction toward which Manchurian films should advance: Man’ei 
films must produce a certain delight that can attract ethnically diverse audiences. According to 
Satō, this feature had regrettably not been adequately developed by Japanese filmmakers, since 
Japanese films were too “Japanese” in their nature and consequently too parochial to be properly 
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understood and enjoyed by foreigners (Satō 1940). Here, we glimpse a universalism inherent in 
his observation that seeks to move beyond simple indoctrination through “Japanese films.” 
This tendency toward a sort of universalism was, in fact, underpinned by two related yet 
distinct orientations in the broader cultural and political discourse in the metropole. First, 
criticism was emerging against the existing film culture in Japan during the last half of the 1930s. 
More specifically, a group of filmmakers, critics, government officials, and social activists 
started to call for renovation of the film production system that had long rested upon profit-
seeking principles and bald corporate interests.5 One of the leading film critics within this faction, 
Tsumura Hideo, more famously known as a discussant at the roundtable discussion of the 
“Overcoming Modernity” symposium, offered the most scathing attack on this phenomenon. 
According to Tsumura, “Japanese film companies were born and raised out of show business and 
usury capital, and this situation had shaped Japanese film culture for the last forty years” 
(Tsumura 1943).6 For him, there seemed to be no choice but to shift his focus in the last ten years 
of his career from film criticism to issues of film policy because of the qualitative degeneration 
of Japanese cinema, a decay that he argued was rooted in the industry’s capitalist mode of film 
production and the blind competition that existed among film production companies. 
Needless to say, such a call for reform prefigured the ensuing legal and political control 
of films by the state, such as the Japan Motion Picture Law of 1939. For many of the Japanese 
Man’ei staff, at least at the level of institutional and social function, Man’ei was anticipated to 
represent an antithesis of the “Americanized” Japanese film culture that was so overtly focused 
on maximizing profits while neglecting the social and pedagogical function of film.7 
 The second aspect of the above-mentioned universalistic tendency is an orientation 
toward what we now call Asianism or Pan-Asianism, or what was at the time called East Asiatic 
universalism (Tōa-teki fuhensei 東?的普遍性), as a cinematic theme. Mizugae Ryōichi, a 
Nikkei director who joined Man’ei in 1939, speaks of his aspiration as a new member as follows: 
 
I wish to create Manchurian films, which can neither be filmed in the United 
States, nor in Japan. I do not want to follow Shanghai films, either. Costumes and 
expressions need not be Westernized at all. Looking up at the Great Wall and the 
slow stream of Songhua River, I see a three-thousand-year history rising from its 
grave. (1939, 60) 
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Here Mizugae calls for the creation of a unique category of Manchurian film based on the lives 
of Asian peoples, distinct from Western films as well as westernized Japanese and Shanghai 
films. He argues that as long as Man’ei films meet the needs of various ethnic groups 
domestically, this universal appeal to the Asian peoples could be extended to Japan, mainland 
China, and even to the United States. 
 This universalistic stance is distinct from the more metropole-centered approach to 
Asianism often found in Pan-Asianist discourse on cinema in the metropole. For instance, 
Tsumura Hideo’s concern about how to overcome Americanism and its mechanical culture led 
him to call for a return to Japanese culture. He even insisted that Japanese films should in the 
long run replace Hollywood films in Southeast Asia. By contrast, Man’ei staff felt that this 
emphasis on Japanese culture through Japanese films must not be directly applied to Manchurian 
culture. Man’ei’s version of East Asiatic universalism aimed to create something distinctively 
East Asiatic (Tōateki ???), a universalism toward which Japanese films must at least be 
renewed, or upgraded. 
In this way, within the discourse on the character of Manchurian films, the problem of 
ethnic harmony was defined in terms of an East Asiatic universality based on multiethnicity. 
Therefore, at least in principle, the theme of “ethnic harmony” represented a key motif in the 
discourse of Manchurian films. In what ways and to what extent it could be represented, however, 
was another complicated task. 
 
Li Xianglan: A Blessing or a Dilemma? 
One of the most successful projects that sought to embody the theme of “ethnic harmony” 
in Man’ei films was the creation of Pan-Asian movie star Li Xianglan (Ri Kōran ???; 
originally named Yamaguchi Yoshiko). Li made her debut in an early Man’ei film, Honeymoon 
Express (Mie yue kuai che, ????, 1938), and in the following years she became one of the 
most popular transcolonial movie stars after appearing in what later came to be known as The 
Continental Trilogy, a series of films coproduced by the major Japanese film companies. 
In those films, Li often portrayed a typical Chinese woman who falls in love with a 
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Japanese man; she was thus believed by many to be a Japanese-speaking Chinese actor. However, 
her Japanese origin was by no means a secret even at the time. Rather, as an actor she maintained 
an ambiguous dual identity as both Japanese and Manchukuoan (or Chinese). This ambivalence 
is revealed in Manchurian local readers’ queries and complaints about her enigmatic identity in 
Man’ei’s official magazine, Film Magazine (Dianying huabao 電影?報).8 
 Li represented the Pan-Asian imaginary rather than a fixed singular ethnic figure in 
Tokyo and Shanghai (Stephenson 1999; Washiya 2001). Notwithstanding some confusion they 
might have caused, her shifting ethnic identity and transnational presence in Asia were 
applauded by critics and audiences in Manchukuo. Indeed, her multicultural characteristics and 
her ability to appeal to audiences across Asia appeared to fit perfectly with the ideal of 
Manchukuo, which officially declared itself a multiethnic nation. 
Dressed alternately in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Mongolian, and Russian traditional 
costumes on the pictorial pages in Manchuria Films, under the heading “Ethnic Harmony: 
Changes of Li Xianglan,” Li visually portrays the theme of “ethnic harmony” by embodying 
various ethnic identities through cross-dressing (figure 1). This poster recalls the famous wall 
painting by Okada Saburōsuke, one of the leading artists of Western painting in Japan, that hangs 
in the lobby of the main government office building in Xinjing. In this painting, five girls from 
different ethnicities joyfully hold one another by the hand, symbolizing harmony among the five 
ethnicities in Manchukuo (figure 2).9 The persona of Li Xianglan successfully incarnated 
precisely this ethnic diversity through her ability to present herself as a cinematic figure with 
various ethnic origins. 
Notwithstanding the powerful symbolic effect of her persona, it should be noted that the 
way in which Li was perceived in Manchukuo differed significantly from how she was perceived 
by Japanese audiences. The screening of China Nights (Shina no yoru, ????, 1940), her 
most successful movie in Japan, was banned within Manchukuo by the censorship authorities. 
They feared that the initial anti-Japanese sentiment held by the female protagonist could provoke 
“undesirable” responses from Mankei audiences (Ikemizu 1941). If we consider that the same 
film was eventually screened in mainland China, this reveals the extreme caution taken by the 
Manchukuo  authorities.  Beneath this overt  anxiety over possible  anti-Japanese sentiment,  
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Figure 1. “Ethnic Harmony: Changes of Li Xianglan.” Source: Manshū eiga (April 1940). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. “Ethnic Harmony.” Source: Manshū Kokushi Hensan Kankōkai (Manshukoku shi 
1971). 
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there probably existed a broader concern about the dynamics of Mankei spectators’ reaction: 
How would the Mankei audience see the film’s depiction of themselves and their relations with 
their Japanese counterparts? To what extent would this narrative of harmony and friendship be 
acceptable to Mankei spectators? Or, to put it differently, would this acceptability backfire and 
provoke “undesired” anti-Japanese sentiments or, even worse, aid audiences in identifying with 
Chinese nationalism? 
Not surprisingly, some Mankei audiences (especially male intellectuals) expressed 
discontent with the films that starred Li Xianglan as a Japanese-speaking Chinese girl. For 
instance, Mankei scenario writer Beigu pointedly accused these Japan-Manchukuo cooperative 
films of “pursuing market interests by infatuating the Japanese audience with a Chinese girl who 
is always more beautiful and smarter than a Japanese girl” (1942, 23). He further argued that “the 
essence of the continent can never be a girl who can speak Japanese” (Bei 1942, 23). These local 
intellectuals likely felt uneasy about a typically gendered representation of the Japanese-Chinese 
relationship, especially with the latter being willingly dominated. 
 Man’ei finally transformed Li Xianglan’s persona from a girl who falls in love with a 
Japanese guy. She played a modest rural girl in Yellow River (Huang he ??, 1942), an 
indigenous girl from Gaoshan in Taiwan in Sayon’s Bell (Sayon no kane サヨンの鐘, 1943), 
and a singing Russian girl in My Nightingale (Watashi no uguisu ???, 1943) (An 2004; 
Makino 2001). None of these characters came close to portraying the type of romantic partner Li 
played in The Continental Trilogy.  
 
“Produce Films for Mankei!”—Vanishing “Ethnic Harmony” 
The problem regarding Mankei spectatorship can be tracked more explicitly by looking 
at a predicament aroused by Man’ei’s early ambitions for “ethnic harmony through film.” As 
stated above, Man’ei’s new Nikkei directors and scriptwriters did not intend to directly import 
“Japaneseness” into Man’ei’s films. During Man’ei’s first few years, these Japanese artists and 
producers eagerly sought to explore what would visually constitute something Manchurian. For 
instance, the Nikkei scenario writer Nakamura Yoshiyuki resolved that he would discover the 
“secrets” of local peoples’ emotions and lives by delving deeper into their languages and cultures 
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(1939, 61). Literary critic Hasegawa Shun, on the other hand, argued that the peculiar 
characteristics of beauty represented by women from each ethic group could successfully enrich 
the themes of Manchurian films (1940, 110).  
The underlying assumption held by these Nikkei artists was that there were certain 
inherent cultures and emotions, presumably in each ethnic group, and that, as directors, their goal 
should be to vividly record these qualities on film. Just as the ideology of “ethnic harmony” was 
primarily based on the assumption of the ontological existence of each ethnic group, Japanese 
filmmakers were convinced that some intrinsic culture and values for each ethnicity existed 
naturally as sources for recording and discovery through the camera lens. This also explains why 
so many of Man’ei’s documentary films (bunka eiga ????) consistently centered on the 
lives of ethnic minorities, such as white Russians, Mongols, and the Manchus living within 
Manchukuo.10 
In fact, this anthropological and ethnographic attitude aligned closely with the 
Manchukuo government’s policy on ethnic minorities. Generally speaking, its strategy can be 
described as “isolation and concentration.” For example, members of the Oroqen, a hunting tribe 
that lived in the forests in the mountainous areas in northern Manchuria, were forced to 
concentrate in isolation in the eastern and western Xing’an provinces, where they were forbidden 
from practicing agriculture and from intermarrying.11 All these restrictions were imposed under 
the banner of “preserving their original culture” (Duara 2003, 180–182). One of the most 
common techniques adopted by documentary filmmakers was ethnographic description of each 
ethnic minority group. Man’ei gradually increased the production of these ethnic films in order 
to preserve the distinct cultures and ways of life of these minorities before they eventually 
became assimilated. 
However, this practice of the “ethnographic gaze” adopted by Nikkei staff members 
provoked unease in some Mankei audience members when the object of the gaze was the Mankei 
people themselves. This tendency is clearly demonstrated in a series of roundtable discussions 
that were held in major cities in Manchuria by Man’ei’s official magazine, Manchurian Film, for 
the purpose of discussing the Mankei response to Man’ei films. A group of Mankei artists and 
journalists who joined a discussion in Fengtian in 1938 unanimously revealed their discomfort 
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with the exoticism in Man’ei films. A scriptwriter criticized Japanese filmmakers’ taste for the 
bizarre in the scenes of boisterous temples and festivals in Ten Thousand Miles in Search of 
Mother (Wan li xun mu ????, 1938), while a journalist claimed that local people were sick 
of seeing such landscapes. Also, most of the participants agreed that Man’ei films should feature 
Manchukuo’s newly modernized and advanced aspects, instead of showing old-fashioned 
customs such as foot binding (chanzu) or queue-style hair (bianfa) (Zadankai 1939). 
These reactions indicate that Mankei intellectuals were keenly aware of Japanese 
producers’ desire to find something rare or different from themselves. Mankei intellectuals 
strongly rejected this Japanese ethnographic gaze. The Nikkei staff in Man’ei had to keep in 
mind that Mankei people themselves, not the Nikkei or Japanese in the metropole, made up the 
majority of its film audience. In films destined for consumption in Japan, they might have been 
able to depict a “primitive culture” with some exotic flavor. But it must have been awkward and 
uncomfortable for local audiences to see images that illustrated their lives and landscapes from 
an outsider’s perspective—that is to say, through the ethnographic gaze of those who ruled. 
Consequently, in the later years of Man’ei, great effort was put into eliminating elements 
that suggested such an ethnographic gaze and might therefore arouse discontent among Mankei 
audiences. Man’ei staff took into consideration criticism against films adapted or translated from 
Japanese originals and those that presented an awkward mixture of Japanese and Chinese 
customs.12 In addition, along with the establishment of the Entertainment Film Department 
(Yumin yinhuabu ?????) during the institutional reform in early 1942, the number of 
Mankei scenario writers and directors drastically increased in anticipation of attracting more 
Mankei audiences. In 1941, when Man’ei produced 30 of its 108 total feature films, 26 
screenplays were written by Mankei writers and directors. Man’ei focused more on comedies and 
melodramas than ever before, in an effort to make its films more similar to those from Shanghai, 
which were overwhelmingly popular among Mankei audiences.13 Mankei critic Fu Zhuo 
discussed this tendency in Man’ei feature film, pointing out a radical change of focus “from 
education to pure pleasure” in 1941 (1943, 56). 
 In the course of moving toward the motto “Films for the Mankei People!” the 
discrepancy between the principle of “ethnic harmony” and the actual practice of film production 
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gradually widened. In feature films that targeted the domestic Mankei audience (and potentially 
the mainland Chinese audience), any implications of ethnic interactions and gestures of 
friendship, especially between Mankei and Nikkei, were deliberately ruled out. Apart from three 
initial feature films and a series of coproduced films starring Li Xianglan, it is surprisingly hard 
to catch a glimpse of the theme of ethnic harmony in most Man’ei feature films.14 In this way, 
the coexistence of ethnically different populations within Manchukuo was carefully concealed in 
the images and narratives of Man’ei feature films, especially the entertainment films.15 
 
Reverberation: Minority Voices for “Harmony of Five Ethnicities” 
“Ethnic harmony” as a national ideal of Manchukuo was often proclaimed in the form of 
the “harmony of five ethnicities” (gozoku kyōwa ????), which referred to Japanese, Han 
Chinese, Korean, Manchu, and Mongol. In actuality, however, the ideal was often reduced to the 
binary relationship between the Nikkei and Mankei, or in contemporary terms, the Japanese and 
Chinese. In other words, although the official taxonomy of ethnicity in Manchukuo regarded the 
“Nikkei” as including the Japanese and Koreans, and the “Mankei” as including the Han Chinese, 
Manchus, and Mongols, more often than not this inherently arbitrary classification left out 
minorities such as Koreans, Manchus, and Mongols. 
In the case of Man’ei, by the same token, “ethnic harmony” was primarily a problem 
between the Nikkei and Mankei. Nikkei staff members, positioning themselves as the agents of 
harmony, had to consistently be aware of the Mankei audience, the majority of Manchukuo’s 
population. The Mankei staff and intellectuals, who were keenly aware of the asymmetrical 
relationship between Mankei and Nikkei, envisioned the Mankei audience in the center of all of 
Man’ei’s activities. For both groups, however, the principle of “ethnic harmony among five 
ethnicities” could be put aside, at least for the time being, in order to make national propaganda 
more attractive to the vast majority of Manchukuo’s population. 
Before such a resolution was reached, however, there was a time when minority voices 
were heard, albeit faintly. In a special section entitled “The Problem of Ethnicity in Man’ei Films” 
in Manshū eiga in 1939, contributors from various ethnic groups expressed competing views on 
the issue. Mankei contributor Sun Pengfei unhesitatingly maintained that it was still too early to 
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produce films that contained elements of ethnic harmony due to the fact that the majority of the 
Manchukuo population was Mankei. Russian and Korean contributors strongly argued against 
this view, ironically, by appropriating and holding on to the official ideology of ethnic harmony. 
Russian contributor M. Vlasov opposed the idea that Man'ei should only focus on one ethnic 
group, that is to say, Mankei (1939, 26). Likewise, Korean journalist Yi T’ae-u harshly attacked 
Man’ei for ignoring “ethnic harmony” and merely seeking to meet the “vulgar taste” of the 
Mankei audience. Furthermore, Yi even proposed creating separate production sections for each 
ethnicity, an arrangement he called “separation for integration” (1939, 24). It was the ethnic 
minorities, like Vlasov and Yi, who acutely sensed that filming the grand slogan of ethnic 
harmony was going amiss. They perceived the discrepancy between what they expected to see 
and what they actually saw. 
 
Sookyeong Hong is a PhD candidate in the department of history at Cornell University. 
 
Notes 
 
1. Even though Mosse did not directly mention films in this context, he still offers valuable 
insights into the “new politics” of modern mass society, in which the masses come to 
acquire the means to participate as political agents through cultural activities. Richard 
Taylor more directly points out the phenomenon in which the political system consistently 
seeks to intervene in the individual’s life by means of propaganda (especially films) and 
calls it “highly politicized” society (1998, 3–6). For the details of film policies in each 
country, see Ricci (2008), Welch (2002), Kenez (1985), and Reeves (1999). For the case in 
Japan, see Katō (2003).  
2. Horiuchi also pointed out that Manchukuo, like Japan, was not alone in redefining 
propaganda in relation to a broader sense of social education, mentioning the official title 
of the office in charge of public information in Germany: “Reichsministerium für 
Volksaufklärung und Propaganda” (Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and 
Propaganda) (1938:5-6).  
3. Naoki Sakai explains this process as “reducing incommensurability of ‘cultural difference’ 
to ‘specific difference,’” thereby making “two particularities as specific difference” into 
“properties of the two different communities” (2005:5-7).  
4. In later years Mankei directors emerged. “Nikkei” and “Mankei” (or “Manjin”) were the 
terms officially used in Manchukuo. They literally mean “of Japanese descent” and “of 
Manchu descent,” respectively, but the former usually included other colonial subjects, 
such as Koreans, and the latter generally referred to the majority Han Chinese, but included 
other ethnic minorities such as Mongols and Manchus. On the ambiguity of the terms, see 
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Tamanoi (2000). I use these terms along with the English translations “Japanese” and 
“Chinese,” not only because they successfully indicate the historicity of the categories in 
the context of the 1930s, but also because they reveal the arbitrariness and nonessentialist 
character of the category of nationality or ethnicity. At the time, the term “Mankei” was 
designed by the Manchukuo authorities to differentiate the Chinese people in Manchukuo 
from those in mainland China, even though the majority of these Mankei people came from 
mainland China as migrant workers and farmers from the late nineteenth century onwards. 
Manchukuo’s official media, like Manshū eiga, always used the term “Manzhouren” 
(pronounced “Manshūjin” in Japanese) or “Manren” (“Manjin” in Japanese), instead of 
“Shinajin,” to refer to those of Chinese descent in Manchuria. In the postwar literature, of 
course, these terms were simply replaced by “Chinese” (Chūgokujin), which makes it 
difficult to elucidate the complicated and contested process of national subject formation. 
5. On the issue of capitalism and film, see Cazdyn (2002).  
6. Even though Tsumura’s argument seems filled with strong totalitarian overlays, he was not 
alone in demanding a reform in the existing film production mechanism, in which 
qualitatively superior and diverse works were defeated and replaced with populist and 
inferior works due to the overheated competition for box office profits among the film 
companies. With its yearly production of more than five hundred films, Japan was one of 
the largest film-producing countries at the time. 
7. Admittedly, it is difficult to determine to what extent these Japanese staff agreed with 
Man’ei’s official policy and whether they were actually critical of Hollywood films. This 
complexity is further aggravated when one observes the ideological and political diversity 
of Man’ei’s staff members, with people occupying extreme positions on the spectrum: from 
those with obvious statist propensities—such as Amakasu Masahiko, the head of Man’ei—
to those of tenkō (converted ??) Marxists such as Ōtsuka Yūshō. However, it would be 
inappropriate as well to regard Man’ei as a mere copy of “original” Japanese film 
companies, or the ideological “enslaving apparatus” of Japanese imperialism. Work 
remains to be done on the relationship between Man’ei and members of its staff who were 
former Marxists filmmakers and critics—particularly those who were members of the 
Proletarian Film League of Japan (Prokino)—and their activities in and after Man’ei.   
8. Interestingly, the editorial staff of the magazine further intensified this ambiguity rather 
than clearing up the question: “Li says she’s Japanese when in Manchuria and 
Manchukuoan when in Japan. However, when she was asked if she was a Korean when in 
the peninsula, she answered no” (Henshūbu 1941). Elsewhere in the magazine, they also 
offered different answers. 
9. Sections of this large-scale wall painting—the central part of the image of the girls and the 
right part of the peasant and fisherman—were later featured on special postage stamps 
commemorating the tenth anniversary of Manchukuo in 1942. See Naitō (2006). Note the 
different composition and arrangement of each ethnicity in the wall painting and in “Ethnic 
Harmony: Changes of Li Xianglan.” The painting, which was physically located in the 
center of Manchukuo politics, has the Japanese girl in the center, while the pictorial page in 
Manshū eiga focuses more on “Mankei,” with the bigger figure. In the world of films in 
Manchukuo, the central position of Nikkei gave way to Mankei.  
10. These documentaries included the Manchuria Ethnography Trilogy (Kazakku no heiwakei: 
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sanka???????????); Manshū no kirisutokyōson: shōhachikashi ?????
???????; and Bokutō Orasai ????????), which was filmed between 
1939 and 1940. In addition, the films on the Mongols include Hulunbei'er (?????  
?), Rama shūtan kesseishiki (???????), Mōko no kanki (?????), Higashi 
Mōko fūbutsu hen (??????), Higashi Mōko ramabyō hen (???????), 
Rakudo shinmōko (樂????), and Mōko	  ryōki (??獵?); films about the White 
Russians were Hyōjō senrei sai (?????), Romanovka mura (??????), and 
Hokuman no Hakkei Rojin (???????). 
11. By the 1930s, many Oroqen had already come to engage in agriculture, as the process of 
Sinicization was underway (see Duara 2003, 182). This clearly shows Manchukuo’s 
official strategy of preventing racial integration in order to divide ethnic groups into 
separate bodies. Interestingly, this strategy contrasts strikingly with the assimilation policy 
Japan extended to other territories and other peoples, such as the Ainu, Okinawans, 
Koreans, and Taiwanese. In terms of socio-economic policy towards ethnic minorities, 
however, the cases of the Ainu and Oroqen show a strong commonality. The two ethnic 
groups were forced to abandon their newly acquired means of livelihood (agriculture, in the 
case of the Oroqen) and return to what were supposedly “traditional” ways of life. For 
more detailed analysis on the Ainu, see Morris-Suzuki (2000). 
12. Some Mankei critics and audience pointed out that many of the Man’ei film titles were so 
odd that it was hard for them to figure out what they meant. For instance, one theater 
manager from Harbin suggested that a better Mandarin title for Mi yue kuai che (????) 
would have been Xin hun kuai che (????) (Zadankai 1938). It seems that mitsugetsu 
??, the Japanese translation of “honeymoon,” was not commonly used in Mandarin 
Chinese at the time.   ?  
13. On Man’ei’s new focus on entertainment films and Mankei personnel, especially after the 
appointment of Amakasu Masahiko as head of Man’ei, see Kang (2007). 
14. The three feature films are Liming shuguang (????, 1940), Dong you ji (???, 1939) 
and Xiandai Riben (????, 1940). According to the synopses of the films, the first is 
about a Nikkei policeman who dies performing his borderline duties, while the latter two 
adopt a similar storyline about Mankei protagonists from rural areas traveling to Tokyo and 
other cities in Japan. The films starring Li Xianglan can be categorized into two types: 
those for which Man’ei simply sent Li to other Japanese or Shanghai film companies for 
coproduction, such as Byakuran no uta (????) with Tōhō and Wan shi liu fang (??
??) with Zhonglian; and those in which Man’ei actively participated in coproduction, 
such as Ying chun hua (???) and Watashi no uguisu (???). The rest of the more 
than one hundred feature films, however, mostly featured the themes of romance, home 
drama, Beijing opera, ancient costume dramas (guzhuang ??), and comedies exclusively 
starring Mankei actors without demonstrating any interethnic contact.       
15. Ironically, however, as part of the effort to spread its influence across East Asia, Man’ei 
began to position itself as the center of “Rising Asia” (Kōa ??) films and sought to grasp 
the leadership of imperial film policy in mainland China by actively intervening in the 
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reorganization of the local film industry, with the cooperation of the imperial army units 
dispatched to Beijing and Shanghai. Man’ei’s attempts to play the leading role in forging a 
coalition among the three largest film organizations on the Mainland reached their peak 
with the organizational meetings of the Mainland Film Confederation and the coproduction 
of Wan shi liu fang (????).  
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